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SENSITIVE

26 JUL 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X
Chief, Near East and South Asia Division

SUBJECT: State Department Discussion Paper for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)
Meeting on Iran-Iraq War

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations.

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Near East and South Asia Division

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SUBJECT: State Department Discussion Paper for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)
Meeting on Iran-Iraq War

1. We have serious reservations with aspects of the attached discussion paper prepared by State in preparation for the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) meeting scheduled for 26 July on "Policy Options for Iran-Iraq War". We have discussed these reservations with the DDI and NIO/NESA who will be the Agency representatives at this meeting.

2. The discussion paper states explicitly that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States "are currently satisfied with the present U.S. policy of neutrality" vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq. As you are aware, this is not the case. [REDACTED]

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3. Woven throughout the State paper are frequent references to "ultimately reestablishing a workable relationship" with the regime in Iran and expressed concerns that the U.S. not take action which would alienate alleged moderate elements in the country. All indications are that this regime's hostility to the U.S. is, and will continue to be, implacable. While there may indeed be moderate elements in, or on the flanks of, the current power structure, and particularly, in the military, we believe it would be a mistake to believe that somehow these elements can be encouraged through actions which fall short of indicating our firm opposition to the policies of this regime. It is unlikely that the Mullahs will lose control of the short term.

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